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This paper examines the question of whether indirect tax rates should be uniform, using four 
different modelling strategies. First, marginal tax reform is examined. This is concerned with the 
optimal direction of small changes in effective indirect tax rates and requires considerably less 
information than the calculation of optimal rates. Second, the welfare effects of a partial shift from 
the current indirect tax system in Australia towards a goods and services tax (GST) are considered, 
with particular emphasis on differences between household types and the role of exemptions. Third, 
in view of the stress on a distributional role for exemptions of certain goods from a GST, the 
potential limits to such redistribution are considered. The fourth approach examines the extent of 
horizontal inequity and reranking that can arise when there are non-uniform tax rates. These 
inequities arise essentially because of preference heterogeneity. 
JEL classification: H24, H31. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the role of exemptions in indirect taxation. There are strong 
limitations to any analysis of only one part of the complete tax and transfer 
system; it is the overall effect that matters. However, a separate analysis is 
warranted in view of the importance attached to indirect taxes. Indeed, there has 
been an extensive heated debate in Australia concerning the reform of indirect 
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taxation and the partial movement towards a general consumption tax, in the 
form of a goods and services tax (GST). Even in countries that have relied for 
some years on a value added tax (VAT) system, attempts to change the nature of 
exemptions usually involve intense debate; an example is the extension of VAT 
to domestic fuel in the UK. 
Differences of opinion are to be expected. Indeed, the configuration of tax 
rates is irrelevant only if judges are indifferent to the distribution of welfare and, 
in addition, if all own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand are zero. In an 
optimal tax framework, there is no presumption in favour of uniformity; the 
conditions under which the maximisation of a social welfare function gives rise 
to uniform indirect taxes are strong and unlikely to hold.
1 However, faced with 
the enormous difficulty of computing a set of optimal taxes, there is often a 
presumption in favour of uniformity on the grounds of the large administrative 
and compliance costs of differentiation. 
Arguments are usually made for exemptions on distributional grounds.
2 These 
arguments (along with the special pleading that must be expected) have 
dominated the recent debate in Australia. A consumption tax imposed at a 
uniform rate on all goods and services has no redistributive effect since the real 
incomes of all households are reduced by the same proportion. A consumption 
tax is most progressive, or inequality-reducing, when it taxes most heavily those 
goods that form a systematically higher proportion of the budgets of high-
expenditure households. This lies behind the argument that some goods, such as 
food, should be exempt from a general consumption tax. But there is a cost of 
such redistribution, since the tax rate imposed on other goods must be higher to 
raise the same revenue, and this may lead to large excess burdens. Rational 
debate requires information about both the costs and the benefits of such 
differentiation. 
This paper reviews the results of several modelling strategies designed to 
examine different aspects of the role of exemptions, using 1993 Household 
Expenditure Survey (HES) data, which are the latest available in Australia. 
Section II considers, instead of optimal tax rates, the more modest problem of 
marginal tax reform, which is concerned with the optimal direction of small 
changes in effective indirect tax rates. Reforms are examined under alternative 
assumptions about distributional judgements. Section III examines the welfare 
effects of the Australian pre-2000 indirect tax system, a hypothetical partial shift 
towards a GST and the exemption of food.
3 Section IV considers the potential 
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limits to redistribution using exemptions and differential rates. Finally, Section 
V considers the extent of horizontal inequity and reranking arising from non-
uniform tax rates because of preference heterogeneity. First, the following two 
subsections describe the effective pre-2000 tax rates in Australia and the 
measurement of demand responses. 
1. Effective Indirect Tax Rates 
Indirect taxes in Australia consist of a complex set of taxes using different tax 
bases and imposed at various stages of the production process. There are many 
indirect taxes, each with its own legislation and administering department, which 
may be at federal, state or local level; see Johnson et al. (1997, pp. 14–17, 22–4). 
These taxes include wholesale sales tax, excise, financial institutions duty, 
payroll tax, land tax, stamp duties, municipal rates and primary production tax. 
Hence, computation of the effective rates requires the construction of a complex 
tax incidence model. 
The rates used here were computed by Scutella (1997), allowing for all the 
inter-industry transactions involved and assuming that taxes are fully shifted 
forward at each stage. These rates were obtained for the 113 categories in the 
Australian input–output matrix for 1993. The commodity groups used in the 
input–output matrix are different from those used in the HES, which are used 
below to provide information about households’ expenditure patterns. In   
 
TABLE 1 
Pre-2000 Effective Indirect Tax Rates 
  No.  Expenditure group  Effective tax-exclusive 
ad valorem rate, ti 
 
  1  Current housing costs  0.1437   
  2  Electricity, gas and other fuels  0.0956   
  3  Food and non-alcoholic beverages  0.1289   
  4  Spirits, beer and wine  0.4224   
 5  Tobacco  2.1510  
  6  Clothing and footwear  0.0731   
  7  Furniture and appliances  0.1201   
  8  Postal and telephone charges  0.0993   
 9  Health  services  0.0603   
  10  Motor vehicles and parts  0.3126   
 11  Recreational  items  0.1677   
  12  Personal care products  0.1441   
 13  Miscellaneous  0.1644   
 14  House-building  payments  0.1296   
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particular, the HES uses only 14 categories, so that any mapping must be 
approximate.
4 
Table 1 gives the HES categories along with the effective tax rates relating to 
indirect tax revenue raised in 1993. The table gives the values of effective tax-
exclusive ad valorem rates, ti. These rates are far from transparent; for example, 
the effective rate on food and non-alcoholic beverages amounts to 13 per cent. It 
is doubtful that the order of magnitude of this effective rate is widely 
appreciated, in view of the complexity and lack of ‘visibility’ of these taxes. 
2. Demand Responses 
It is desirable to allow for consumers’ responses to tax and price changes. This is 
important not only for the calculation of tax rates required to achieve revenue-
neutral changes, but also for the analysis of the welfare effects of changes. This 
presents a severe problem in Australia because of the paucity of data. 
Researchers in Australia do not have access to a time series of household 
expenditure data, and the available time-series consumption data are aggregative 
and cover few commodity groups. 
The demand elasticities used below were obtained using a result established 
by Frisch (1959) for directly additive utility functions, which relates own- and 
cross-price elasticities to total expenditure elasticities, budget shares and the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of income (the so-called ‘Frisch parameter’). 
There are well-known criticisms of the use of additivity; for example, it does not 
allow for complements. Where welfare changes are obtained, these are based on 
the linear expenditure system (LES), a special case of an additive utility 
function. In view of these strong assumptions, the results must be treated with 
caution.
5 The alternative is to make the unrealistic assumption that demand 
patterns are fixed when prices change. 
The approach involves a set of price elasticities being computed for each of a 
range of total expenditure groups for several household types, following the 
general approach suggested in Creedy (1998a) and described briefly in the 
Appendix.
6 Instead of using a single set of parameters, estimates of the LES are 
obtained for each household type for each of a number of total expenditure 
groups. Households within each group are assumed to have the same 
                                                                                                                                    
4Two HES items — superannuation contributions and mortgage repayments — have been excluded from the 
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5General equilibrium effects are also ignored here. Changes in factor prices could, in principle, counteract the 
welfare effects of commodity price changes. For example, a tax imposed on a good that comprises a high 
proportion of total expenditure of low-wage households may involve, through output and factor substitution 
effects, and depending on relative factor intensities, a compensating rise in the incomes of those households. 
6The suite of programs, under the title of Demand And Welfare Effects Simulator (DAWES), is available from 
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preferences, but these are allowed to vary between groups.
7 Hence, a very large 
number of elasticities are computed. 
II. MARGINAL TAX REFORM 
This section examines the optimal direction of marginal tax reforms from an 
existing system, following the approach of Ahmad and Stern (1984 and 1991); 
see also Madden (1995 and 1996). It is based on the use of a social welfare 
function, representing explicit value judgements. 
1. Marginal Revenue Cost 
Social welfare is expressed as W = W(U1,...,UH), where Uh is the utility of 
household h, for h = 1, ..., H. Let xhi denote the consumption of good i (for 
i = 1, ..., n) by household h and yh the total expenditure of household h. If τi is the 
tax imposed on each unit of good i, then aggregate tax revenue is 





















The rule for optimal tax reform is to lower τi relative to τj if ρi is less than ρj. This 



















where ηhki is household h’s elasticity of demand for good k with respect to the 
price of good i (pi) and 
*
k t  is the ratio of the tax to the tax-inclusive price. Hence, 
*
k t  is the tax-inclusive ad valorem rate.
8 The term vh is the social marginal utility 
of household h; it measures the increase in W resulting from a change in 
household h’s total expenditure; that is, vh = (/ ) ( /) hh h WU U y ∂∂ ∂ ∂ . 
                                                                                                                                    
7If all households have identical tastes, additivity implies that optimal indirect tax rates are uniform. However, 
this does not arise in the present context because of the allowance for heterogeneity of expenditure patterns 
between groups. 
8It is possible to rewrite equation (2) in terms of the aggregate demand for good i, Xi. The change in revenue is 
piXi+ΣkτkηkipkXk, where ηki is the aggregate cross-price elasticity. However, in the following analysis, the 
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The expression for ρi in equation (2) looks simple compared with the 
requirements of optimal tax calculations, but it cannot be applied easily to actual 
tax structures. The three components — that is, the tax rates, demand elasticities 
and welfare weights — are discussed in the next subsection. 
2. Components of the MRC 
Equation (2) requires a set of effective tax rates imposed on final consumers. 
Table 1 gives tax-exclusive rates, ti, though equation (2) requires the values of 
tax-inclusive rates; these are obtained using 
* /(1 ) ii i tt t =+ . 
The social welfare function is usually specified in terms of each household’s 
total expenditure, yh, rather than utility, and the contribution to social welfare of 
household  h is specified as 
1 /(1 ) h y
ε ε
− − , where ε is the inequality aversion 
coefficient; on the use of total expenditures rather than utilities, see Banks, 
Blundell and Lewbel (1996). This implies that vh =  h y
ε − . The implications of 
adopting alternative values of ε are examined.
9 The value of ε measures the 
degree of concavity of the function 
1 /(1 ) h y
ε ε
− −  and therefore reflects the extent 
to which an income transfer from a richer to a poorer person improves social 
welfare. 
The computation of demand elasticities uses the assumptions described 
briefly above and in the Appendix. Equation (2) involves only changes in 
demand evaluated at the current position, instead of complete information about 
the demand functions. Hence, the results are unlikely to be strongly influenced 
by the demand system used. Comparisons of the implications of using alternative 
demand systems, carried out by Decoster and Schokkaert (1990), Madden (1996) 
and Ray (1997), show that similar results are obtained for different systems. 
3. Empirical Results 
The marginal revenue costs for the HES categories are presented in Table 2 for 
inequality aversion coefficient values of 0, 0.3 and 1.2. The highest value of ε 
represents a substantial degree of inequality aversion.
10 
                                                                                                                                    
9In practice, vh was calculated as (yh/10000)
–ε, where yh is weekly total expenditure in cents. The adjustment 
simply affects the absolute values of ρ, but only their relative values are of significance in considering marginal 
tax reform. 
10Consider two individuals such that y2 = 2y1 and suppose that $1 is taken from person 2, but in attempting to 
transfer this to person 1, something is lost. A judge with ε = 0.3 would be prepared to make the transfer so long 
as person 1 gets at least 81 cents (obtained using  12 2 1 (/) | ( / ) W dy dy y y
ε − =− ). A judge with ε = 1.2 would be 
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TABLE 2 
Marginal Indirect Tax Reform 
Expenditure group  ε = 0  ε = 0.3  ε = 1.2 
  Ρ r ρ  ρ r ρ  ρ r ρ 
Current  housing  costs  0.8570 4  0.3780 3  0.0255 3 
Electricity, gas and other fuels  0.8573  5  0.3665  1  0.0223  1 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages  0.8582  7  0.3810  5  0.0263  5 
Spirits, beer and wine  0.8386  2  0.3830  6  0.0297  8 
Tobacco 0.8757  14 0.3708  2 0.0234  2 
Clothing  and  footwear  0.8729 13  0.4155 12  0.0361 12 
Furniture  and  appliances  0.8658 11  0.4177 13  0.0378 13 
Postal and telephone charges  0.8598  9  0.3795  4  0.0256  4 
Health  services  0.8641  10 0.3877  7 0.0280  6 
Motor vehicles and parts  0.8380  1  0.3976  9  0.0344  10 
Recreational  items  0.8569  3 0.4039  10 0.0343  9 
Personal  care  products  0.8583 8  0.3893 8  0.0287 7 
Miscellaneous  0.8575  6 0.4093  11 0.0360  11 
House-building  payments  0.8718 12  0.4662 14  0.0630 14 
 
Since only the relative values of the marginal welfare costs are important in 
determining the preferred directions of tax reforms, Table 2 also indicates the 
ranking of ρ, denoted rρ, from lowest to highest values. Following the rule of 
lowering the tax rate for those commodity groups with relatively low values of 
the marginal revenue cost, ρi, the results in Table 2 suggest, for example, reforms 
of raising effective indirect taxes for tobacco in the absence of inequality 
aversion and of lowering the rate for positive values of ε. The first case is 
dominated by the low efficiency costs of taxing tobacco, while the second case is 
dominated by the behaviour of the budget shares. Tax on this commodity is, in 
practice, also affected by other well-known arguments, such as those relating to 
external effects and merit goods. 
Other changes in the ranking as ε is increased from zero to a positive level 
include motor vehicles and recreational items, where efficiency effects alone 
suggest reductions in relative tax rates but allowance for inequality aversion 
implies tax rate increases. The results are influenced by the pattern of budget 
shares; these items form a systematically higher proportion of the budgets of 
higher income groups. It is therefore clear that judges with no aversion to 
inequality would disagree with people having positive aversion, over the 
appropriate pattern of marginal tax reforms, depending on the precise degree of 
aversion. Health services is another example of a commodity group where 
efficiency considerations suggest an increase in the effective tax rate, whereas 
equity effects suggest a relative reduction, with a ranking of 6 for ε = 1.2. Food 
has approximately the middle rank of 7 when ε is zero, and this falls for positive Fiscal Studies 
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inequality aversion; however, despite its importance in the policy debate, food 
does not have the lowest rank even for high values of ε. 
Further analysis showed that, in some cases, the ranking becomes stable once 
very low values of ε are passed; the ranks of electricity, gas and other fuels and 
of food and non-alcoholic beverages move down, while those of furniture and 
appliances, recreational items and miscellaneous move upwards. Hence, in the 
case of these categories, a wide range of judges, from those having low to those 
having high degrees of aversion to inequality, would display substantial 
agreement about the direction of marginal tax reforms required to increase social 
welfare. The recent debate may therefore be said to reflect these results. 
III. WELFARE EFFECTS OF NON-MARGINAL REFORMS 
This section moves from marginal reforms to examine the welfare effects of 
large indirect tax changes. Special attention is given to the effects on different 
types of household. The welfare measure used is the equivalent variation, which 
measures the amount, after the tax change, that the household would be prepared 
to pay to return to the old prices.
11 The variation in the ratio EV/y, as total 
household expenditure, y, varies, provides a useful indication of tax 
progressivity. In particular, if the tax change causes all prices to increase in the 
same proportion, so that  i pp = !!  for all i, it can be shown that EV/y =  /(1 ) pp + !!  
for all y (see the Appendix). 
1. Different Household Types 
There are many different types of household, but in view of the small number of 
observations, not all of these could be examined. The types of household 
distinguished are listed in Table 3. The nine household types shown in the table 
comprise about 75 per cent of all households in the HES. Summary measures of 
the distributions of total weekly expenditure within each household category — 
the lower and upper quartiles and the median — are shown in Table 3. 
Suppose that, from an initial situation in which there are no indirect taxes, the 
rates shown in Table 1 are imposed. The proportional price change arising from 
the imposition of a new tax is simply  i p !  = ti, for all i = 1, ..., n. Using the 
approach described in the Appendix, these rates produce the equivalent 
variations reported in Table 4 for each household type and range of values of y, 
expressed in dollars per week. Blank cells in the table arise where households  
 
                                                                                                                                    
11If prices change from p0 to p1, the equivalent variation is EV = E(p1,U1) – E(p0,U1), where E(p,U) is the 
minimum expenditure required to achieve utility level U at prices p. Total expenditure, y = E(p1,U1), is 
assumed to remain unchanged. Indirect Tax Reform and the Role of Exemptions 
465 
TABLE 3 
Distribution of Households 
Type 
no. 
Household type  Sample 
size 
Distribution of 
total weekly expenditure 




1 All  households  7,590  336  556  845 
2  Couple, no children  1,430  407  606  8,785 
3  Couple, no children, at least one retired  450  242  327  448 
4  Couple, one dependent child  586  505  656  904 
5  Couple, two dependent children  790  515  708  996 
6  Couple, three or more dependent children  540  531  717  983 
7  Single parent, one dependent child  190  270  354  478 
8  Single parent, two or more dependent children  187  300  397  525 
9  Single person, not retired  1,000  214  337  528 
10  Single person, retired  620  131  181  249 
 
TABLE 4 
Equivalent Variations and EV/y by Household Type and Total Expenditure 
y ($)  Household type 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
  Equivalent variation ($ per week) 
200  34 34 30 41      37  37 39  30 
400  70 69 63 75 68 66  70  70 73  60 
600  102 102  94 102  97 101  95  95 102  90 
800  134 132 127 131 124 131    127 128   
1,000  164 162 159 159 153 162     154   
1,200  207 192   205 195 205     200   
1,400  235 233   230 220 223         
 EV/y 
200 0.170 0.170 0.150 0.205      0.185 0.185 0.195 0.150 
400 0.175 0.173 0.158 0.188 0.170 0.165 0.175 0.175 0.183 0.150 
600 0.170 0.170 0.157 0.170 0.162 0.168 0.158 0.158 0.170 0.150 
800 0.168 0.165 0.159 0.164 0.155 0.164    0.159 0.160   
1,000 0.164 0.162 0.159 0.159 0.153 0.162      0.154   
1,200  0.173  0.160  0.171  0.163  0.171    0.167  
1,400 0.168 0.166    0.164 0.157 0.159         
Notes: Blank cells arise where households were not observed at these levels. See Table 3 for listing of 
household types. 
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were not observed at these levels. Comparisons of the absolute welfare change 
between household types, for the same total expenditure level, can be made by 
moving along a given row of the table. 
The values for couples without children (types 2 and 3) correspond closely to 
those obtained for all household types combined (type 1), but the other 
household types show somewhat different results. The largest absolute losses of 
those in the lower expenditure groups are experienced by couples with one 
dependent child (type 4). By comparison, the losses experienced by couples with 
relatively higher total expenditure, but with two dependent children (type 5), are 
lower than those for other household types. Households consisting of a single 
retired person (type 10) are generally concentrated in the lower expenditure 
groups, yet the absolute welfare loss is lower than for any other households in 
comparable groups. 
The ratio EV/y rises only for the very lowest expenditure groups, but 
generally falls slightly as expenditure rises over the bulk of expenditures and 
then becomes stable. However, for couples with no dependent children and at 
least one retired person (type 3), the ratios rise gradually over the observed range 
of total expenditures, indicating a slightly progressive effect. It is neutral for 
single retired people (type 10). For couples with one dependent child (type 4), 
the ratio begins higher in the lower expenditure ranges and falls more rapidly as 
total expenditure rises. For couples with three or more dependent children (type 
6), the ratio is slightly smaller for those in the lower and higher total expenditure 
groups. Hence, despite differences among household types, the indirect taxes are 
slightly regressive (except for the two retired household types 3 and 10). 
2. Alternative Reforms 
Rather than attempting to consider the precise (and highly complex) reforms that 
took place in Australia in July 2000, this paper is concerned with the more 
general issues relating to the role of non-uniformities. Consider an alternative 
indirect tax system whereby many of the pre-2000 indirect taxes are eliminated 
and replaced with a uniform goods and services tax imposed on most goods and 
services. Instead of eliminating all indirect taxes, wholesale taxes, payroll taxes, 
financial institutions taxes, stamp duty and petrol excise tax are replaced by a 
broad-based goods and services tax (GST).
12 
(a) Effective Tax Rates 
The effective tax rates arising from the remaining indirect taxes are shown for 
each expenditure group in Table 5 under the column ‘Remaining’; these were 
obtained using the method described by Scutella (1997). The GST is imposed in  
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TABLE 5 
Tax Rates for Alternative Reforms 
No. Expenditure  group  Remaining
a  Reform A  Reform B 
1  Current housing costs  0.0852  0.0852  0.0852 
2  Electricity, gas and other fuels  0.0411  0.1642  0.1972 
3  Food and non-alcoholic beverages  0.0468  0.1699  0.0468 
4  Spirits, beer and wine  0.2842  0.4073  0.4403 
5 Tobacco  2.0835 2.2066 2.2396 
6  Clothing and footwear  0.0209  0.1440  0.1770 
7  Furniture and appliances  0.0211  0.1442  0.1772 
8  Postal and telephone charges  0.0249  0.1480  0.1810 
9  Health  services  0.0201 0.1432 0.1762 
10  Motor vehicles and parts  0.0436  0.1667  0.1997 
11  Recreational  items  0.0824 0.2055 0.2385 
12  Personal care products  0.0220  0.1451  0.1781 
13  Miscellaneous  0.0716 0.1947 0.2277 
14  House-building  payments  0.0246 0.1477 0.1807 
aEffective tax rates arising from the remaining indirect taxes. 
 
addition to these rates. In practice, it is hard to tax all goods and services. In 
view of the difficulty of taxing the imputed rents of owner-occupied housing, the 
major untaxed category is current housing costs.
13 
Reform A considered below has a uniform consumption tax applied to all 
other items.
14 The GST rate for this reform was found by trial and error to be 
12.31 per cent. This ensures revenue neutrality, allowing for the fact that 
differential price changes lead to substitution in consumption. For this purpose, 
the elasticities obtained for all households combined were used. The calculation 
of aggregate revenue necessarily took into account only goods and services 
consumed domestically, ignoring exports. The rates used here may therefore be 
expected to be slightly lower than would be required in practice. The overall 
effective rates for reform A are also shown in Table 5. 
In reform B, food is also exempt from the GST.
15 The associated reduction in 
the tax base means that, to ensure revenue neutrality, the tax rate imposed on 
non-exempt goods must be increased to 15.61 per cent, giving the effective rates 
shown in Table 5. The same method can be applied to any tax reform. 
Emphasis is given to the once-and-for-all price changes and associated 
welfare changes resulting from a policy change from the pre-2000 system of 
                                                                                                                                    
13Other categories that are often exempt include second-hand goods, gambling and financial transactions. 
However, the level of aggregation of commodity groups in the HES does not allow for separate consideration of 
these. 
14An issue arises as to whether a GST would be applied to alcohol and tobacco in addition to the existing taxes 
on these goods. The following analysis assumes that it would be applied, in contrast with Johnson et al. (1998). 
15A distinction is, in practice, usually made between home-consumed and other food. Fiscal Studies 
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Table 1 to each reform in turn. In obtaining the price changes resulting from a 
tax change, suppose the effective tax rate for a particular expenditure category 
changes from t1 to t2 as a result of the policy change. The resulting proportionate 
price change is equal to (t2–t1)/(1+t1). 
(b) Welfare Changes 
The equivalent variations for each of the household types, measured in dollars 
per week, are shown in Table 6 for a shift from the current system to reform A. 
The negative values of EV indicate gains from the change. These equivalent 
variations give some indication of the extent to which it may be desired to 
increase transfer payments, such as the age pension, following such a reform. 
The results for all households combined conceal some interesting differential 
effects. The column for all households (type 1) shows that the gains or losses do 
not exceed $2 per week for any total expenditure level, although the results for 
separate household types show that the absolute losses can be higher. The largest 
absolute losses are experienced by couples with two or more children (types 5 
and 6) in the higher total expenditure groups, although within these categories 
the ratio EV/y is small and declines slightly. Low-total-expenditure couples with 
one dependent child (type 4) gain slightly. Within the lower total expenditure  
 
TABLE 6 
Welfare Changes for Reform A: Equivalent Variations and EV/y 
y ($)  Household type 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
  Equivalent variation ($ per week) 
200  1.4 1.5  2.5  –0.4     0.6 0.6  –0.4  2.4 
400  1.2 1.7  4.4 0.9  2.1  1.9  0.4 1.7  –2.1  0.6 
600 1.2  1.5 4.7  1.4 3.2  3.2  0.6 –0.8  –2.9 0.9 
800  1.2 1.1  0.8 1.0  3.9  4.2   –1.1  –3.4  
1,000 1.2  0.7 1.0 –0.5 4.6  5.3      –2.7   
1,200  1.2 0.5  –2.5  5.0  6.4     –3.2  
1,400 0.8  –0.3    –1.1 4.8  6.1         
 EV/y 
200 0.007 0.008  0.013  –0.002      0.003 0.003  –0.002  0.012 
400 0.003 0.004  0.011 0.002  0.005  0.005  0.001 0.004  –0.005  0.002 
600  0.002  0.003 0.008  0.002 0.005  0.005  0.001 –0.001  –0.005 0.002 
800 0.002 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.005  0.005    –0.001  –0.004   
1,000  0.001  0.001 0.001 –0.001 0.005  0.005      –0.003   
1,200  0.001  0.000  –0.002  0.004  0.005     –0.003  
1,400  0.001  –0.000    –0.001  0.003  0.004      
Notes: Blank cells arise where households were not observed at these levels. See Table 3 for listing of 
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groups, couples with at least one person retired (type 3) experience the largest 
absolute losses; these are therefore also the largest relative losses. Single-person 
non-retired households (type 9) gain from such a tax shift. Single-parent 
households (types 7 and 8) with relatively higher total expenditure also 
experience small gains from such a shift. 
The effects of a shift from the current system to reform B are shown in Table 
7. By exempting food and increasing the GST rate accordingly, none of the 
higher total expenditure groups gains, while many of the lower total expenditure 
groups gain. However, for couples with at least one person retired (type 3), the 
gains are small and the losses in the middle total expenditure groups are 
relatively high compared with other demographic types. For couples with one 
dependent child (type 4), the losses among the higher total expenditure groups 
are relatively lower than those for other household types. Single-person non- 
retired households (type 9) are affected by the exemption of food: a shift to 
reform B involves gains for the lower total expenditure groups and high losses 
for the middle and higher groups. 
An important result is that welfare losses are substantially higher when 
moving to reform B because of the higher tax rates involved. This reflects the 
fact that the tax burden increases disproportionately with the absolute value of  
 
TABLE 7 
Welfare Changes for Reform B: Equivalent Variations and EV/y 
y ($) Household  type 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
  Equivalent variation ($ per week) 
200 –1.1 –1.7 –0.8 –3.1      –1.7 –2.6 –2.0  0.5 
400 –1.5 –0.7  1.7 –2.6 –2.3 –5.0 –1.3 –2.5 –1.9  3.3 
600  –0.3 0.8 4.4  –0.6  –1.0  –2.5 3.2 1.0 1.1  4.9 
800 1.5 3.8 8.8 1.0 2.7 1.0    1.3 5.6   
1,000 3.7 7.1  11.0 3.1 5.3 3.4      13.0   
1,200 6.4  10.0    5.1 8.9 7.8      15.4   
1,400 11.2 15.9    10.9 17.9 18.5         
 EV/y 
200  –0.006 –0.009 –0.004 –0.016      –0.009 –0.013 –0.010  0.003 
400  –0.004 –0.002  0.004 –0.007 –0.006 –0.013 –0.003 –0.006 –0.005  0.008 
600 –0.001 0.001 0.007  –0.001  –0.002  –0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002  0.008 
800  0.002 0.005 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.001    0.002 0.007   
1,000  0.004 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.003      0.013   
1,200  0.005 0.008    0.004 0.007 0.007      0.013   
1,400  0.008 0.011    0.008 0.013 0.013         
Notes: Blank cells arise where households were not observed at these levels. See Table 3 for listing of 
household types. Fiscal Studies 
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the tax rate. Rational policy analysis requires that the redistributive gains arising 
from exemptions are explicitly traded off against the higher efficiency costs of 
taxation. This aspect is usually absent from popular debate and is considered in 
the following subsection. 
3. Social Evaluations 
An overall evaluation of a tax change can be made using a specified social 
welfare or evaluation function, expressed in terms of the distribution of 
equivalent incomes.
16 Equivalent income is defined as the income (here, total 
expenditure) level, ye, that, at a set of reference prices, gives the same utility as 
the actual set of prices. The following results use pre-tax prices as reference 
prices, and the calculation of equivalent income is described in the Appendix. 
Consider, for example, the social welfare function used in Section II, where, 
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with N being the number of individuals and ε being the inequality aversion of the 












where  yede is the equally distributed equivalent value — that is, the equally 
distributed value that gives the same social welfare as the actual distribution. It 
can be shown that 
(5)  () 1 ede e yy A ε = −   , 
where  e y  is the arithmetic mean and A(ε) is Atkinson’s inequality measure of 
equivalent income, where, by definition, A(ε) = 1–yede/ e y . Instead of using 
equation (4), it is more convenient to write an abbreviated form of the welfare 
function simply as yede as in equation (5), since it expresses the same trade-off 
between mean equivalent income and its equality, or the trade-off between 
equity and efficiency, that the judge finds acceptable. In this case, a 1 per cent 
increase in equality is viewed as being equivalent to a 1 per cent increase in 
mean income. Alternative forms of the welfare function are used below. For 
example, welfare rationales are available for the use of equation (5) along with 
                                                                                                                                    
16An initial analysis might first examine the generalised Lorenz curves for the distributions of equivalent 
incomes to see if standard dominance results apply; see Lambert (1993). Indirect Tax Reform and the Role of Exemptions 
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the Gini and extended Gini inequality measures substituted for the Atkinson 
measure.
17 The extended Gini is defined, for v ≥ 1, by 
(6)  [] {}
1





=− − . 
Since an overall evaluation, combining households of differing compositions, 
is required, it is necessary to obtain equivalent income per equivalent adult. 
There is an enormous literature on the topic of equivalence scales and it is 
recognised that the choice of scales cannot escape the use of value judgements. 
However, the following analysis uses a very simple adjustment, based on 
Johnson, Manning and Hellwig (1995), who discuss alternative scales used in 
Australia. The first adult is given a weight of 1, the second adult is given a 
weight of 0.6 and each child is given a weight of 0.3. For household types 2 to 
10, the numbers of equivalent adults were set respectively to 1.6, 1.6, 1.9, 2.2, 
2.6, 1.3, 1.7, 1 and 1. 
Summary measures of the distribution of equivalent income per equivalent 
adult are shown in Table 8, for alternative structures. Results are given for low 
and high values of inequality aversion, and in the case of the extended Gini 
measure, G(v), the value v = 2 corresponds to the standard Gini. The effect of the 
pre-2000 system of indirect taxes is to increase all measures of inequality 
slightly. A revenue-neutral shift to reform A produces a small increase in 
inequality and a reduction in social welfare. As more exemptions are introduced,  
 
TABLE 8 
Distributions of Equivalent Income per Equivalent Adult 
ε y ede A (ε)   v  G(v)  e y [1–G(v)] 
No taxes 
0.10  352.73 0.0168    1.10 0.0579 338.01 
1.60  274.39 0.2352    2.60 0.3983 215.88 
All indirect taxes: pre-2000 
0.10  294.72 0.0172    1.10 0.0587 282.28 
1.60  228.34 0.2386    2.60 0.4018 179.37 
Reform A 
0.10  294.60 0.0174    1.10 0.0590 282.13 
1.60  227.70 0.2405    2.60 0.4036 178.80 
Reform B 
0.10  294.96 0.0169    1.10 0.0581 282.60 
1.60  229.49 0.2352    2.60 0.3990 180.34 
 
                                                                                                                                    
17On alternative abbreviated welfare functions, see Lambert (1993). Fiscal Studies 
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the overall effect is to reduce inequality further and to increase social welfare for 
all degrees of inequality aversion and using both the Atkinson and Gini 
measures. Hence, in terms of the trade-off discussed above, the reduction in 
inequality is judged to outweigh the efficiency losses arising from the higher tax 
rate required when food is exempt, even for the low value of inequality aversion. 
However, the changes in all cases are small.
18 
The question arises of whether these results conceal differences for the 
separate household types. Calculations for separate household types (not 
reported here) revealed that the current system of indirect taxes produces a very 
slight fall in inequality among households consisting of couples with no children 
and at least one person retired and among single retired people.
19 For all other 
types of household, the inequality measures of income per equivalent adult 
increase while social welfare measures, as expected, decrease. Reform A lowers 
social welfare and increases inequality slightly for all degrees of inequality 
aversion for all household types except for single non-retired people. Within this 
latter group, there is an improvement in social welfare despite the slight rise in 
inequality. The exemption of food reduces inequality across all household types 
for all inequality measures. It also raises social welfare in all cases except 
couples with no children and single non-retired people. For the latter group, an 
increase is observed only if inequality aversion is sufficiently large. However, 
for the lowest value of inequality aversion considered, the exemption of food 
lowers social welfare, compared with the pre-2000 system, for couples without 
children and for the two types of retired households.
20 
IV. THE LIMITS TO REDISTRIBUTION 
In the previous section, the exemption of food was found to introduce a small 
amount of redistribution to the indirect tax structure, and this outweighs 
efficiency costs so long as there is a small degree of aversion to inequality. This 
is consistent with the suggestion that indirect taxes provide a blunt instrument 
for redistribution: for example, see Stern (1990, p. 102) and Chisholm, Freebairn 
and Porter (1990, p. 150).
21 This section looks at the question of how much 
                                                                                                                                    
18This is associated with the flattening of the EV/y profile observed earlier. 
19Reference may again be made to the profiles of EV/y found earlier for these household categories. 
20It was found that the additional exemption of health services actually lowers social welfare in many cases. For 
couples with three or more dependent children, both single-parent groups and single non-retired people, social 
welfare falls compared with reform B unless inequality aversion is very high, except for single parents with two 
or more children where even an aversion of 1.6 does not produce an increase. This is associated with the fact 
that budget shares for health expenditure do not decline systematically as total expenditure increases, for some 
household types. 
21Sah (1983) considers the use of commodity taxes and subsidies (negative taxes) in order to improve the 
welfare of the worst-off individual, subject to the government budget constraint. He obtains an upper limit in 
terms of the maximum budget share of the worst-off as a ratio of the minimum average budget share in the 
economy. Indirect Tax Reform and the Role of Exemptions 
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redistribution can be achieved using consumption taxes, by considering the 
implications of adopting extreme forms of indirect taxation. 
One obvious limitation on the ability of indirect taxes to influence inequality 
is that virtually all broad commodity groups are consumed by all types of 
households and at all total expenditure levels. In practice, it would be possible to 
find certain luxury goods that are most likely to be consumed only by high-
income households. Like high marginal income tax rates at very high incomes, 
these are not likely to produce much revenue or have much overall impact on 
inequality. Differentiation by narrow commodity groups or brand names would 
involve considerable administrative problems. 
In addition, households with high total expenditure have relatively more 
ability to substitute away from more highly taxed commodity groups; the 
expenditure over which they have more discretion (or supernumerary 
expenditure) is a higher proportion of total expenditure for such groups. This is 
true of the LES demand system used here. It also weakens the case for imposing 
high tax rates on goods that form a higher proportion of the budgets of 
households with high total expenditure. 
1. Budget Shares and Tax Structures 
The argument relating to indirect tax progressivity and variations in budget 
shares with total expenditure can be restated more formally as follows. The total 





ii t = wi, where wi is the budget share of good i. The elasticity of T with 























where the ei = 1+(dwi/dy)(y/wi) are total expenditure elasticities. 
An increasing budget share is equivalent to ei > 1, and since η > 1 for a 
progressive tax structure, equation (7) indicates that goods with total expenditure 
elasticities greater than 1 should be taxed most heavily in order to obtain the 
greatest progressivity. However, some progressivity can be obtained even if 
taxes are imposed on some goods for which ei < 1 at some income levels. 
Furthermore, the elasticities vary with y. Examination of the HES data reveals 
that, in those cases for which ei > 1 at all levels of y, the elasticity declines as y 
                                                                                                                                    
22The elasticity is also the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate. It is in fact the Musgrave–Thin 
measure of liability progression. Fiscal Studies 
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increases.
23 This again provides a constraint on the progressivity of an indirect 
tax structure, since the tax rate has to be set independently of individuals’ total 
expenditure levels. 
The budget shares fall consistently in the cases of: current housing costs; 
electricity, gas and other fuels; food and non-alcoholic beverages; postal and 
telephone charges; health services; and personal care products. An extreme 
attempt to make the indirect tax structure progressive would therefore not tax 
these commodity groups. The budget shares rise with total expenditure in the 
cases of: clothing and footwear; furniture and appliances; motor vehicles and 
parts; recreational items; miscellaneous; and house-building payments. These 
groups would therefore be taxed in any system attempting to reduce inequality. 
In the cases of alcohol and tobacco, the budget shares initially rise before falling, 
so that the effects of taxes on these groups are ambiguous. 
2. Alternative Tax Structures 
Based on the variations in budget shares, consider three hypothetical tax 
structures, shown in Table 9. In case 1, a uniform consumption tax of 0.15 is  
 
TABLE 9 
Alternative Revenue-Neutral Tax Structures 
No.  Expenditure group  Tax structure 1  Tax structure 2  Tax structure 3 
1  Current housing costs  0.15     
2  Electricity, gas and other fuels  0.15     
3  Food and non-alcoholic beverages  0.15     
4  Spirits, beer and wine  0.15     
5 Tobacco  0.15     
6  Clothing and footwear  0.15  0.30  0.30 
7  Furniture and appliances  0.15  0.30  0.30 
8  Postal and telephone charges  0.15     
9 Health  services  0.15     
10  Motor vehicles and parts  0.15  0.40  0.30 
11  Recreational  items  0.15 0.20 0.30 
12  Personal care products  0.15     
13  Miscellaneous  0.15 0.20 0.30 
14  House-building  payments  0.15 0.40 0.30 
                                                                                                                                    
23This is consistent with the elasticities converging towards unity, though the convergence may not be uniform. 
The budget shares are also affected by the tax structure, since  i w ! = ti+Σrei,rti, where ei,r is the cross-price 
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imposed on all goods and services.
24 This has no redistributive effect but the 
resulting revenue is treated as the benchmark for comparing the other tax 
structures, which are revenue-neutral. The tax rates were calculated using an 
iterative search procedure, having specified which groups are exempt and the 
relative levels of the other tax rates. If ti denotes the ad valorem tax-exclusive 
consumption tax rate imposed on good i, then the proportional increase in the 
price of the good,  i p ! , is obtained using  ii pt = ! . 
In structures 2 and 3, only those goods whose budget shares rise with income 
are taxed. Structure 2 has relatively higher taxes imposed on those groups for 
which the shares increase relatively faster with income. Structure 3 has a 
uniform tax of 30 per cent on each non-exempt category. In each case, the same 
total revenue is obtained as in case 1, allowing for substitution in consumption. 
The exemption of eight commodity groups means that, after applying the 
iterative search procedure, the tax rate must be doubled to ensure revenue 
neutrality.
25 These two structures have far more selectivity than has been 
suggested in practice. 
The equivalent variations for the alternative tax structures, for a range of 
levels of weekly total expenditure (in dollars), are shown in Table 10. For 
structure 1, which imposes a uniform rate of ti = 0.15 for all i,  0.15 i pp == !!  for 
all i, and  / /(1 ) 0.13 EV y p p =+ = !!  for all values of y. Under structures 2 and 3, 
the ratio EV/y increases as y increases, which is consistent with an inequality-
reducing effect.
26 The effect of moving from the uniform selective structure (3)  
 
TABLE 10 
Ratio of Equivalent Variations to Total Expenditure 
  y ($)  Tax structure 2  Tax structure 3   
 200  0.075  0.078   
 400  0.098  0.102   
 600  0.116  0.118   
 800  0.128  0.129   
 1,000  0.138  0.138   
 1,200  0.147  0.145   
 1,400  0.160  0.157   
                                                                                                                                    
24Uniform taxation is not optimal even though additive preferences are assumed, because of the assumption of 
heterogeneity. In practice, it is very difficult to tax all goods (for example, imputed rents from owner-occupied 
housing). 
25It was purely coincidental that the alternative structures involve such convenient rates. Starting from a 
different uniform rate in case 1 would give less convenient numbers for the other cases. 
26The revenue is the same in all comparisons, so inequality reduction and disproportionality of tax payments 
(tax progressivity) move in the same direction. Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 11 
Equivalent Income per Equivalent Adult 
ε y ede A (ε)   v  G(v)  e y [1–G(v)] 
Uniform taxes 
0.10  562.08 0.0212    1.10 0.0646 537.17 
1.60  394.33 0.3133    2.60 0.4472 317.48 
Tax structure 2 
0.10  563.01 0.0193    1.10 0.0611 539.03 
1.60  407.57 0.2901    2.60 0.4295 327.52 
Tax structure 3 
0.10  562.95 0.0195    1.10 0.0615 538.84 
1.60  406.59 0.2919    2.60 0.4313 326.54 
 
to the non-uniform structure (2) is that the ratio EV/y increases more rapidly as y 
increases, but this difference is small, despite the fact that some rates are 
increased, while others are reduced, by 10 percentage points. 
Values of inequality and social welfare (based on equivalent incomes per 
equivalent adult, as discussed earlier) are shown in Table 11. It can be seen that 
structures 2 and 3 give rise to lower values of inequality and higher social 
welfare. The inequality reduction therefore outweighs the reduction in average 
equivalent income per equivalent adult as the tax becomes more progressive. 
However, for all degrees of inequality aversion, the reduction in inequality is 
small, considering the substantial differences between the tax structures. 
V. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
The previous sections have emphasised the use of exemptions to generate 
vertical redistribution. However, differential indirect taxes can also give rise to 
horizontal inequity and reranking effects. Horizontal inequity relates to the 
unequal treatment of equals, whereby those with equal incomes pay different 
amounts of tax. Reranking refers to the unequal treatment of unequals, where the 
rank order of households with different pre-tax incomes is not the same as the 
rank order of their post-tax incomes. The reranking arises because of differences 
in the budget shares of households with similar levels of total expenditure. 
This section examines the orders of magnitude of the three different 
components of redistribution. This analysis does not allow for demand changes, 
because it is essential to preserve the full variation in household budget shares. It 
is their heterogeneity that influences the horizontal inequity and reranking 
effects, and preference functions cannot be estimated for individual households. Indirect Tax Reform and the Role of Exemptions 
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1. A Decomposition of Redistribution 
Suppose that the tax and transfer system is such that net or post-tax expenditure, 
x, is given by x = y–T(y). Divide the population into N groups. Within each 
group, individuals have similar pre-tax values of y, yk for k = 1, ..., N. Groups are 
ranked in ascending order, with y1 < y2 < ... < yN. Aronson, Johnson and Lambert 
(1994) show that the reduction in the Gini measure of inequality, L, is given by
27 







=−− − ∑ , 
where Gy is the Gini measure of pre-tax income; G0 is the between-groups Gini 
measure of post-tax expenditure, obtained by replacing every post-tax 
expenditure within each group by the arithmetic mean; θk is the product of the 
population share and the post-tax expenditure share of those in group k; and Gk is 
the Gini measure of inequality of post-tax expenditure of those in group k. The 
term, R, is a measure of reranking, equal to Gx–Cx, where Cx is the concentration 
measure.
28 The possibility of reranking of individuals, when moving from the 
pre-tax to the post-tax expenditure distribution, introduces an unequal treatment 
of unequals which is contrary to the vertical redistribution intended by the form 
of the tax function; see Atkinson (1979) and Plotnick (1981). The first two terms 
measure vertical redistribution, V, and horizontal inequity, H, respectively; hence 
L = V–H–R.
29 
In practice, few exact pre-tax equals are observed in survey data, so the 
decomposition in equation (8) cannot be applied directly. If groups of near-
equals are used, this decomposition must be modified; for example, in the first 
term, it is necessary to replace Gy with a corresponding between-groups measure, 
obtained (like G0) by replacing individual values in each group of near-equals 
with the mean value. Further complications arise with the measure of horizontal 
inequity. This issue is examined in detail by van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert 
(1998), who show that the measured vertical effect initially increases as the class 
width is increased, and then falls after reaching a maximum. This suggests a 
strategy whereby the class width used to combine individuals into groups of 
near-equals is chosen as the value that maximises the estimated vertical effect. 
The reranking measure, R, can be obtained directly using the ungrouped values 
                                                                                                                                    
27Aronson et al. (1994) examine income taxes. The decomposition is applied to indirect taxes in Belgium by 
Decoster, Schokkaert and Van Camp (1997a and 1997b). 
28The concentration index, Cx, of x is similar to the Gini inequality measure, where the ranking of individuals 
by y is maintained. 
29This decomposition extends that produced by Kakwani (1977), who shows that L = {g/(1–g)}K–R, where g is 
the ratio of aggregate tax to aggregate income, K = Ct –Gy and Ct is the tax concentration index. Hence, K is a 
measure of the disproportionality of tax payments which combines the horizontal and vertical effects. Fiscal Studies 
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and is therefore not affected by the choice of class width. The horizontal effect 
can then be obtained using H = V–R–L. 
2. Empirical Results 
This subsection considers the pre-2000 tax system and reform B, examined in 
Section III, where food and current housing costs are exempt from a GST. 
Separate demographic groups are identified, so there is no need to use 
equivalence scales. The inequality reductions for each of the household types, 
when moving from total gross expenditure to consumption net of indirect taxes, 
are shown in Table 12. The negative values for the pre-2000 system indicate, as 
expected, that it is slightly inequality-increasing, except for the two types of 
retired households (types 3 and 10). Reform B is inequality-reducing. 
The decomposition of the redistributive effect of indirect taxes into vertical, 
horizontal and reranking effects was computed for the pre-2000 system and for 
tax reform B. The results, presented in Table 13, show the three components of 
the reduction in inequality resulting from the indirect tax structures, along with 
the percentage contributions of each to the total. In cases where the indirect taxes 
produce positive redistribution (L > 0) (such as household types 3 and 10), the 
percentage contribution of vertical redistribution must exceed 100. For each tax 
structure and household type, the class width used in grouping households into 
near-equals varied between about $22 and $30 per week (using the strategy 
described above). 
The results in Table 13 demonstrate that there are substantial differences 
between household types in the proportional contributions of vertical 
redistribution, horizontal inequity and reranking. Horizontal inequity generally 
contributes less than one percentage point to the inequality change, but reranking  
 
TABLE 12 
Redistributive Effect for Different Household Types 
No.  Household type  Inequality reduction 
   Pre-2000 Reform  B 
1 All  households  –0.0013  0.0020 
2  Couple, no children  –0.0021  0.0017 
3  Couple, no children, at least one retired  0.0018  0.0057 
4  Couple, one dependent child  –0.0017  0.0015 
5  Couple, two dependent children  –0.0013  0.0026 
6  Couple, three or more dependent children  –0.0027  0.0027 
7  Single parent, one dependent child  –0.0013  0.0011 
8  Single parent, two or more dependent children  –0.0020  0.0042 
9  Single person, not retired  –0.0038  0.0016 
10  Single person, retired  0.0029  0.0057 Indirect Tax Reform and the Role of Exemptions 
479 
TABLE 13 
Decomposition of Redistribution for Alternative Tax Structures 
Household 
type 
V  Per cent    100H Per  cent    100R Per  cent 
  Pre-2000 taxes 
1 –0.0009  71.39    0.0008  0.66    0.0351  27.94 
2 –0.0017  80.55    0.0001  0.05    0.0402  19.39 
3 0.0025  132.84    0.0024  1.32    0.0582  31.53 
4 –0.0013  76.29    0.0024  1.45    0.0416  25.16 
5 –0.0010  75.77    0.0020  1.51    0.0341  25.74 
6 –0.0024  87.56    0.0004  0.13    0.0344  12.57 
7 –0.0008  64.17    0.0031  2.42    0.0489  38.25 
8 –0.0016  79.29    0.0038  1.92    0.0368  18.79 
9 –0.0032  84.91    0.0013  0.35    0.0584  15.44 
10 0.0036  123.46    0.0036  1.27    0.0640  22.19 
  Reform B 
1 0.0022  112.95    0.0002  0.09    0.0255  12.86 
2 0.0020  116.46    0.0001  0.05    0.0286  16.41 
3  0.0063  110.59  0.0062  1.08   0.0543 9.51 
4 0.0018  122.15    0.0017  1.14    0.0314  21.01 
5  0.0028  108.71  0.0009  0.35   0.0213 8.36 
6  0.0029  109.30  0.0000  0.00   0.0247 9.30 
7 0.0017  148.25    0.0073  6.40    0.0476  41.85 
8  0.0046  111.06  0.0071  1.69   0.0391 9.36 
9 0.0020  128.62    0.0020  1.26    0.0433  27.36 
10 0.0064  111.97    0.0105  1.84    0.0579  10.13 
Note: See Table 12 for listing of household types. 
 
is substantial.
30 For household types 3 and 10, where at least one person is 
retired, the current system involves positive redistribution. However, it would be 
substantially larger without the negative effect of the reranking, which reduces 
redistribution by 32 per cent for type 3 and by 22 per cent for type 10. 
The largest amount of reranking and horizontal inequity under the pre-2000 
system is among single parents with one dependent child (type 7). For these 
households, the introduction of a general consumption tax that exempts current 
housing costs and food was found to have the smallest redistributive effect, of 
0.0011. From Table 13, this arises because of the substantial amount of 
reranking and horizontal inequity, which together form a negative contribution of 
48 per cent of redistribution. 
                                                                                                                                    
30Horizontal inequity has also been found to be very low for income taxation, but reranking produced by 
income taxes is much lower than reranking in the present context. See Creedy and van de Ven (2001). Fiscal Studies 
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The other households for which the exemptions produce relatively small 
positive redistributions are couples with one dependent child (type 4) and single 
non-retired people (type 9). Table 13 reveals that this low redistribution arises 
because of the large negative effect of reranking. Indeed, the exemption of food 
increases the percentage contribution of reranking among single non-retired 
people (though the absolute reranking measure falls slightly). Single parents with 
two or more dependent children (type 8) have little reranking, and the 
redistributive effect of exempting food is relatively large for them; see Table 12. 
For the pre-2000 system, which is regressive for most household types, the 
extent of reranking is substantial. Reform B increases progressivity as a result of 
the exemption of food, but involves an increase in the absolute amount of 
horizontal inequity for half of the household types (even though their percentage 
contributions decline in most cases). This makes the overall redistributive effect 
of the additional exemption less than it otherwise would be. 
These results demonstrate the important role played, in particular, by 
reranking. The combined negative effect on inequality reduction (or, in the case 
of the pre-2000 system for most household types, inequality increase) of the 
horizontal inequity and reranking effects is not trivial. The redistributive 
argument for non-uniformity of indirect tax rates is based on variations in 
average budget shares as total household expenditure increases. However, the 
heterogeneity in expenditure patterns (among households with similar 
demographic characteristics and total expenditure levels) has been found to play 
an important but neglected role. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has implemented four modelling strategies to examine the role of 
non-uniformities, particularly exemptions, in indirect tax structures. The 
analyses were based on the Australian pre-2000 tax system and several 
hypothetical reforms, using household budget data. Three of the four strategies 
allowed for demand responses to price changes in evaluating tax rates required 
for revenue-neutral reforms. Welfare changes, where reported, were based on the 
use of the linear expenditure system. Exemptions or tax reductions designed to 
introduce progressivity involve taxing less heavily those goods for which the 
total expenditure elasticity is less than unity, so that budget shares fall as total 
expenditure increases. These require higher tax rates (than in a uniform system) 
to be imposed on other goods, so that efficiency costs of redistribution need to be 
considered. Equity and efficiency trade-offs were examined using a range of 
assumptions about inequality aversion and the form of a social welfare function. 
First, marginal tax reforms, concerning the optimal direction of small changes 
in effective indirect tax rates, were examined. A small amount of inequality 
aversion was found to generate support for marginal reductions in tax rates on 
food and domestic fuel. Indirect Tax Reform and the Role of Exemptions 
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Second, the welfare effects of a partial shift towards a GST were considered. 
The exemption of food shifts the welfare gains to the lower and middle total 
expenditure groups, the highest gains being experienced by couples with three or 
more dependent children. The absolute welfare losses in the higher-total-
expenditure households increase substantially. Nevertheless, the equity effects of 
exempting food were found to outweigh the efficiency costs arising from the 
higher rates, given a small degree of inequality aversion. Exemptions beyond 
that of food produce effects that are much more equivocal. 
Third, the potential redistributive abilities of non-uniform indirect taxes were 
examined. There are strong limitations in view of the fact that virtually all 
households consume some goods in all broad commodity groups, and elasticities 
ultimately tend to unity as total expenditure rises. Exemptions were found to 
provide a ‘blunt redistributive instrument’. 
The fourth strategy examined the extent of horizontal inequity and reranking 
that, because of preference heterogeneity, can arise with non-uniform tax rates. 
The pre-2000 system was found to produce a substantial amount of reranking. 
Indirect tax reform, which involves a degree of flattening of the structure even 
with food exempt, reduces the percentage contribution of horizontal inequity and 
reranking to the overall redistribution, for most household types. 
A consistent result is that only a small amount of inequality aversion is 
sufficient to generate support (an increase in social welfare) for the exemption of 
food from a general consumption tax, despite the efficiency costs involved. The 
results obviously relate to the analysis of indirect taxes independently of other 
redistributive taxes and transfer payments. In contrast with indirect taxes, the 
direct tax system offers a much sharper redistributive instrument and has been 
found to involve less reranking and horizontal inequity. Hence, the possibility 
that the direct tax system may generate the required degree of redistribution with 
lower efficiency costs than exemptions would need to be considered in a more 
comprehensive analysis. 
The limitations imposed by the need to make strong assumptions regarding 
consumer responses, in order to overcome data deficiencies, must be kept in 
mind. However, it is inevitable that popular debate concerning exemptions tends 
to be dominated by rhetoric and special pleading, where value judgements and 
assumptions are seldom made explicit. Disputes may also be related to 
uncertainty regarding the effects of a large-scale reform to the tax structure. 
There is thus some value in attempting to provide information, while recognising 
limitations, about the potential orders of magnitude involved, using the 
alternative types of strategy discussed here. Fiscal Studies 
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APPENDIX 
UTILITY, DEMAND ELASTICITIES AND WELFARE 
This appendix describes the method used to obtain demand elasticities and 
welfare changes using the linear expenditure system (LES), applied separately 
for a range of demographic groups (though the following notation generally 
omits the additional subscript). 
1. Demand Elasticities and Utility 
The first stage is to obtain, for each household type, a set of average budget 
shares, wki, for each consumption category, i, and a range of total expenditure 
groups, k. The total expenditure elasticities are obtained using the variations in 
budget shares for each commodity group. However, the observed variability in 
budget shares gives rise to some negative total expenditure elasticities. This can 
be overcome by smoothing the data. The approach used was first to carry out a 
series of ordinary least squares regressions of the form 
(A1) 
1








for each commodity group (and household type), where the values of yk 
correspond to the arithmetic mean values of total expenditure in each group, k. 
The form in equation (A1) provides a reasonably good fit for most groups and 
ensures that the predicted weights add to unity. 
The second stage is to compute own- and cross-price elasticities, eii and eij, 
(again for each total expenditure group and household type) using Frisch’s 
(1959) results for additive demand systems. The expressions require the use of 
the elasticity of the marginal utility of total expenditure with respect to total 
expenditure,  ξ, often referred to as the ‘Frisch parameter’. If δij denotes the 
Kroneker delta, such that δij = 0 when i ≠ j and δij = 1 when i = j, Frisch showed 









=− + + 

. 
It is necessary to make use of extraneous information about the way in which the 
Frisch parameter varies with total expenditure. A flexible specification, which 
extends the logarithmic form used by Lluch, Powell and Williams (1977), for the 
variation in ξk with yk is given by 
(A3)  () ( ) ln ln kk y ξφαθ −= − + . Indirect Tax Reform and the Role of Exemptions 
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By a process of trial and error, values of 9.2, 1.05 and 177 respectively for φ , α 
and θ were found to produce appropriate values of ξ. However, in view of the 
role played by the Frisch parameters and the lack of a really firm foundation for 
the values used, it is important to carry out a range of sensitivity analyses. 
Alternative sets of values, giving relatively steep and flat profiles, were used but 
the main results were found to be similar to those reported above. 
The third stage involves obtaining parameters of the LES direct utility 







γ =− ∏ , 
where xi is the consumption of good i, γi is the committed consumption of good i, 
0 ≤ βi ≤ 1 and Σiβi = 1. The own-price elasticity, eii, is given by 



















where y is total expenditure and pi is the price of good i. Having obtained the 
total expenditure elasticities from the smoothed budget shares, the corresponding 
values of βi at each total expenditure level were obtained using equation (A6), 
whereby βi = eiwi. Using the values of own-price elasticities as described in the 
second stage above, equation (A5) can be used to solve for piγi, the committed 
expenditures for each good. 
2. Equivalent Variations 
As before, the various parameters vary with y, but the additional subscript is 











The expenditure function, E(p,U) — the minimum expenditure required to 
achieve U at prices p — is found by inverting equation (A7) and substituting E 
for y to get Fiscal Studies 
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(A8) ( , ) Ep U A B U =+ . 
If the vector of prices changes from p0 to p1, the equivalent variation, EV, is 
EV = E(p1,U1)–E(p0,U1). Substituting for E using equation (A8) gives 
(A9)  () 00 1 EV y A B U =− + . 











=− + −  
  
. 
The term A1/A0 is a Laspeyres-type price index, using γis as weights. The term 
B1/B0 simplifies to Πi 10 (/)
i
ii pp
β , which is a weighted geometric mean of price 
relatives. These two terms can be expressed in terms of the  p ! s.
31 If all prices 
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since B1/B0 = A1/A0 = 1+ p ! . 
3. Equivalent Incomes 
Equivalent income, following King (1983), is the value, ye, that, at some 
reference set of prices, pr, gives the same utility as the actual income level. In 
this context, income and total expenditure are synonymous. Hence, ye is defined 
by V(pr,ye) = V(p,y). Using the expenditure function gives 
(A12)  () ,(,) er yE p V p y = . 
For the linear expenditure system, this gives 
                                                                                                                                    
31Since  10 (1 ) ii i pp p =+ ! , and defining si = p0iγi/Σip0iγi, it can be shown that A1/A0 = 1+Σisi i p !  and   
B1/B0 = Πi (1 )
i
i p












    =+ −    
   
∑∑ ∏ . 
If pre-change prices are used as reference prices, so that pri = p0i for all i, the 
post-change equivalent income is the value of actual income (total expenditure) 
after the change less the equivalent variation; that is, y1e = y1–EV. 
In general, the equivalent income function is not guaranteed to be concave, 
leading to the problem that its use in a social welfare function could lead the 
latter to favour disequalising transfers. Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) show 
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